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Unshared Secret Key Cryptography
Shuiyin Liu, Yi Hong, and Emanuele Viterbo
Abstract—Current security techniques can be implemented
with either secret key exchange or physical layer wiretap codes.
In this work, we investigate an alternative solution for MIMO
wiretap channels. Inspired by the artificial noise (AN) technique,
we propose the unshared secret key (USK) cryptosystem, where
the AN is redesigned as a one-time pad secret key aligned
within the null space between transmitter and legitimate receiver.
The proposed USK cryptosystem is a new physical layer cryp-
tographic scheme, obtained by combining traditional network
layer cryptography and physical layer security. Unlike previously
studied artificial noise techniques, rather than ensuring non-zero
secrecy capacity, the USK is valid for an infinite lattice input
alphabet and guarantees Shannon’s ideal secrecy and perfect
secrecy, without the need of secret key exchange. We then show
how ideal secrecy can be obtained for finite lattice constellations
with an arbitrarily small outage.
Index Terms—perfect secrecy, ideal secrecy, secret key, physical
layer security, MIMO wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast characteristics of wireless communication
systems are struggling to provide security and privacy. Re-
search on secure communication falls into two categories:
network layer cryptography and physical layer security. The
former assumes that the physical layer provides error-free data
links, in which security depends on encryption. In the latter,
the strategy is to use the characteristics of wireless channels to
protect the secret data from eavesdropping without the need of
encryption. Despite the differences between these categories,
both are rooted in Shannon’s perfect secrecy [1], which is
defined as the mutual information I(u; y) = 0; that is, the
secret message u and the eavesdropper’s received message y
are mutually independent. Perfect secrecy requires one-time
pad secret key v [1]. A weaker version of perfect secrecy
is ideal secrecy [1], in which no matter how much of y is
intercepted, there is no unique solution of u and v but many
solutions of comparable probability.
Wyner [2] introduced physical layer security by replac-
ing the shared secret key in Shannon’s model with channel
noise, achieving weak secrecy ( lim
n→∞
1
nI(u; y) = 0) through
channel coding as the codeword length n goes to infinity.
Csisza´r subsequently proposed strong secrecy [3] based upon
lim
n→∞
I(u; y) = 0, which further reduced information leakage.
These pioneering results require that the intended receiver
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has a better channel than the eavesdropper, leading to a long
line of research that relies on noise or fading to degrade
the eavesdropper’s channel. Here, the secrecy capacity is
defined as a measure of the transmission rate, below which
the eavesdropper can recover no information [4]. For Gaussian
wiretap channels with a helping interferer, Tang et al. [5]
studied achievable secrecy rate and secrecy capacity. For
wireless fading channels and multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) wiretap channels, Gopala et al. [6] and Liu et al.
[7] derived secrecy capacities. In the context of wiretap code
design, polar codes achieving strong secrecy over discrete
memoryless channels have been proposed in [8]. For Gaussian
wiretap channels, nested lattice codes achieving strong secrecy
were proposed in [9]. The impact of finite code length and
finite constellations on Eve’s equivocation rate was studied in
[10]. Physical layer security schemes, in general, require an
infinite-length wiretap code to approach the secrecy capacity;
this limits the applicability of these schemes to practical
communication systems.
In contrast to physical layer security, traditional crypto-
graphic techniques can protect the secret message, even when
secrecy capacity is zero. Its aim is to achieve semantic
secrecy [11], so that it is physically infeasible to extract
any information about u due to the very high computational
complexity involved. The most widely used cryptographic
technology is public-key cryptography [12], which requires
two separate keys: a public key that encrypts the plaintext
and a secret key that decrypts the ciphertext. An example is
the NTRU cryptosystem [13], where the secret key is based
on a short vector of a convolutional modular lattice, Λ, and
the public key corresponds to the Hermite normal form basis
of Λ [14]. For wiretap channels, public-key cryptography has
been extensively studied in [15], [16], which focus on issues
of secret-key generation and distribution problems. Bloch
et al. [17] showed how to implement secret-key agreement
using low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes. In [18], turbo
codes are introduced to speed up the encryption and decryp-
tion processes of the advanced encryption standard (AES)
cryptosystems. Although traditional cryptographic techniques
can be applied independently to communication channels, the
exchange of secret keys between transmitter and intended
receiver is required. A significant challenge is to reduce the
risk of key disclosure during its distribution.
Despite the similarities between cryptography and physical
layer security, and the potential for major advances in cryp-
tography through combining their advantages, the theoretical
connections between them have not yet been investigated.
One direction has been to add controlled interference at the
eavesdropper side – that is, to jam the eavesdropper at the
physical layer. This idea extends previous studies that were
2limited to the assumptions on the eavesdropper’s channel
noise. In the literature, it is commonly assumed that the
transmitted message and jamming signal follow a multivari-
ate Gaussian distribution. The standard strategy of existing
jamming techniques, such as artificial noise (AN) [19] and
the cooperative jammer [20], is to ensure theoretical non-zero
secrecy capacity. In [21], we proposed a variant of AN using a
finite M-QAM alphabet, called practical secrecy (PS) scheme,
where, instead of increasing the secrecy rate with AN, the
eavesdropper’s error probability is maximized.
In this work, we analyze the security of the PS scheme
from an information theoretical perspective. This theoretical
advance shows that the PS scheme is de facto an unshared
secret key (USK) cryptosystem, where AN serves as an un-
shared one-time pad secret key. The result is a development of
our understanding of the benefits of AN, with a cryptographic
perspective. We show that the USK provides Shannon’s ideal
secrecy, with no secret key exchange, under Goel et al.’s
assumptions on the physical channels that enable the use of
the AN scheme.
Our work differs from previous studies of AN [19], [22],
because it puts forward four new aspects that were not
previously accounted for:
1) Shannon’s secrecy: we aim at achieving Shannon’s ideal
secrecy and perfect secrecy, rather than ensuring non-zero
secrecy capacity. We show that perfect secrecy is achieved
in the high-power AN limit.
2) Finite alphabet based on QAM signaling: with practical
perspective, we use finite input alphabets rather than the
Gaussian input.
3) Artificial noise: we have no special requirement of the
distribution of AN; that is, not necessarily Gaussian.
4) Secrecy outage: we show that Shannon’s ideal secrecy
can be achieved for finite signal constellations with an
arbitrarily small outage probability.
Section II presents the system model. Section III and IV
describe the USK cryptosystem with infinite lattice constella-
tions. Section V and VI analyze the USK cryptosystem with
finite lattice constellations. Section VII provides a discussion
on open questions. Section VIII sets out the theoretical and
applied conclusions. The Appendix contains the proofs of the
theorems.
Notation: Matrices and column vectors are denoted by upper
and lowercase boldface letters, and the Hermitian transpose,
inverse, pseudo-inverse of a matrix B by BH , B−1, and B†,
respectively. The inner product in the Euclidean space between
vectors u and v is defined as 〈u,v〉 = uTv, and the Euclidean
length ‖u‖ = √〈u,u〉. The Frobenius norm of matrix A
is denoted by ‖A‖F . Let {Xn, X} be defined on the same
probability space. We write Xn a.s.→ X if Xn converges to X
almost surely or with probability one.
We use the standard asymptotic notation f (x) = O (g (x))
when lim sup
x→∞
|f(x)/g(x)| <∞. 0m×n denotes an m× n null
matrix. In denotes the identity matrix of size n. We write ,
for equality in definition. vol(S) denotes the Euclidean volume
of S. The cardinality of a set A is defined as |A|.
A circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable
x with variance σ2 is defined as x ∽ NC(0, σ2). A Chi-squared
distributed random variable x with k degrees of freedom is
defined as x ∽ X 2(k). The gamma function is represented by
Γ(x). The real, complex, integer and complex integer numbers
are denoted by R, C, Z, and Z [i], respectively. E(x) and Var(x)
represent the mean and variance of the random variable x.
ℜ(·) and ℑ(·) represent real and imaginary parts of a complex
number. H(·), H(·|·) and I(·) represent entropy, conditional
entropy and mutual information, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The MIMO wiretap system model is given as follows. The
number of antennas at the transmitter (Alice), the intended
receiver (Bob), and the passive eavesdropper (Eve) are denoted
by NA, NB, and NE, respectively. Alice would like to com-
municate with Bob with arbitrarily low probability of error,
while maintaining privacy and confidentiality. Alice transmits
the information signal x, and Bob and Eve receive z and y,
respectively, given by
z = Hx+ nB, (1)
y = Gx+ nE, (2)
whereH ∈ CNB×NA and G ∈ CNE×NA are the channel matrices
of Bob and Eve. We assume that all the channel matrix
elements are i.i.d. NC(0, 1) random variables (i.e., Bob and
Eve are not co-located). We assume that the noise vectors
nB and nE have i.i.d. NC(0, σ2B) and NC(0, σ2E) components,
respectively.
In this work, we assume that
1) Alice knows the realization of H.
2) Alice only knows the statistics of G, which varies in each
transmission.
3) Eve knows the realizations of H and G.
No assumption is needed about the statistics of H during
transmission, since its realization is known to Alice and Eve.
Our secure transmission strategy is based on the artificial
noise scheme [19] and the practical secrecy scheme [21],
which are summarized below.
A. Artificial Noise Scheme
In the AN scheme [19], NB is assumed to be smaller than
NA, thus H has a non-trivial null space with an orthonor-
mal basis given by columns of the matrix Z = null(H) ∈
C
NA×(NA−NB)
, i.e.,
HZ = 0NB×NB . (3)
Let u ∈ CNB×1 be the transmitted vector carrying the informa-
tion, and let v ∈ C(NA−NB)×1 represent the “artificial noise”
generated by Alice but is unknown to Bob and Eve.
Alice performs SVD precoding and transmits
x = V
[
u
v
]
= V1u+ Zv, (4)
where the columns of V = [V1, Z] are the right-singular
vectors of H (i.e., H = UΛVH , where U ∈ CNB×NB ,
Λ ∈ CNB×NA , V ∈ CNA×NA , UHU = INB , VHV = INA ).
3Due to the orthogonality between V1 and Z, the total
transmission power ||x||2 can be written as
||x||2 = ||u||2 + ||v||2. (5)
Alice has an average transmit power constraint P ,
P ≥ E(||x||2) = E(||u||2) + E(||v||2). (6)
The AN scheme in [19] is based on the assumptions below:
1) u and v are assumed to be Gaussian random vectors.
2) NA > NB, NA > NE and NE ≥ NB
The condition NE ≥ NB guarantees that Eve has at least the
same number of degree of freedom as Bob. This puts Eve in
the position of not losing a-priori any information that Bob
could receive.
Equations (1) and (2) can then be rewritten as
z = HV1u+ nB, (7)
y = GV1u+GZv + nE. (8)
and show that v only degrades Eve’s reception, but not Bob’s.
The purpose of the AN scheme is to degrade Eve’s channel,
so that the secrecy capacity is positive [19]. Like other wiretap
schemes, to achieve the secrecy capacity, explicit wiretap
codes are required. A strong secrecy rate R is achievable if
there exist a sequence of wiretap codes {Cn} of increasing
length n and rate R, such that both Bob’s error probability
and the amount of information obtained by Eve approach zero
when n→∞ [3], [9], i.e.,
lim
n→∞
Pr {uˆ 6= u} = 0, (reliability)
lim
n→∞
I(u;y) = 0, (strong secrecy)
where uˆ represents Bob’s estimation of u.
B. Practical Secrecy Scheme
Rather than attempting to increase secrecy rate, in [21], we
proposed a variant of the AN scheme, named practical secrecy
(PS) scheme, where Eve’s error probability is maximized.
Although the transmission model is the same as that of AN,
the most important difference lies in the distributions of u and
v:
1) M-QAM transmitted symbols: u ∈ QNB with uniform
distribution, where ℜ(Q) = ℑ(Q) = {−√M+1, −√M+3,
...,
√
M − 1}.
2) There is no requirement on the distribution of v.
Different from the AN scheme, where the achievability
of security is based on an infinite-length wiretap code, the
PS scheme [21] is designed for practical communication
systems, that make use of finite input alphabets based on M-
QAM transmitted symbols. The aim is to ensure that Eve’s
block error probability approaches one with minimum distance
decoding, (e.g. sphere decoder), rather than strong secrecy.
However, this security criterion is not satisfactory from an
information-theoretic security viewpoint, as it may not ensure
security for all information bits within a message.
C. Proposed AN Scheme
Different from the original AN scheme [19], in this work,
we set a peak AN power constraint,
Pv ≥ ||v||2. (9)
This peak power constraint is essential to prove the secrecy of
USK, as detailed in Section III-A.
Moreover, we consider two lattice constellation models:
1) Infinite constellations with average power constraint
2) Finite constellations with peak power constraint
We focus on information theoretic security, hence, our
analysis will focus on Eve’s equivocation H(u|y).
Throughout the paper, we consider the worst-case scenario
(for Alice) that Eve’s channel is noiseless, i.e.,
y = GV1u+GZv. (10)
Using Data Processing Inequality, it is simple to show that
Eve’s channel noise can only increase her equivocation:
H(u|GV1u+GZv) ≤ H(u|GV1u+GZv + nE). (11)
We further consider the worst-case scenario (for Alice)
that Eve’s antenna array elements are uncorrelated, i.e., the
columns of G are zero-mean independent complex Gaussian
vectors with an identity covariance matrix.
For a general complex Gaussian random matrix Gˆ with
an arbitrary non-singular covariance matrix Σ (which is the
covariance matrix of Eve’s antenna array), we can write
Gˆ = Σ1/2G. (12)
Using Data Processing Inequality, it is simple to show that
Eve’s antenna correlation can only increase her equivocation:
H(u|GV1u+GZv) ≤ H(u|Σ1/2GV1u+ Σ1/2GZv). (13)
Remark 1: Throughout this paper, the proposed security
analysis of USK scheme is valid for a complex Gaussian
random matrix G with an arbitrary non-singular covariance
matrix Σ. The extension to USK of other distributed random
matrix G will be studied in our future work.
D. Shannon’s Secrecy
We consider a cryptosystem where a sequence of K mes-
sages {mi}K1 are enciphered into the cryptograms {yi}K1 using
a sequence of secret keys {ki}K1 . We recall from [1] the
definition of Shannon’s ideal secrecy and perfect secrecy.
Definition 1: A secrecy system is ideal when
lim
K→∞
H({mi}K1 | {yi}K1 ) 6= 0,
lim
K→∞
H({ki}K1 | {yi}K1 ) 6= 0. (14)
Shannon explained the concept of ideal secrecy in [1] as:
“No matter how much material is intercepted, there is not a
unique solution but many of comparable probability.” It was
discussed in [23] how a system achieving ideal secrecy is
indeed unbreakable.
Definition 2: A secrecy system is perfect when
H({mi}K1 | {yi}K1 ) = H({mi}K1 ). (15)
4In the special case that {mi}K1 and {ki}K1 are mutually
independent, using the entropy chain rule, we have
H({mi}K1 ) =
K∑
i=1
H(mi) (16)
H({mi}K1 | {yi}K1 ) =
K∑
i=1
H(mi|yi), (17)
H({ki}K1 | {yi}K1 ) =
K∑
i=1
H(ki|yi). (18)
From (17) and (18), ideal secrecy is achieved if H(mi|yi) 6=
0 and H(ki|yi) 6= 0 for one of any i. To protect all the
messages, in this work, we use a slightly stronger condition
as our design criterion for ideal secrecy, given by
Definition 3: If {mi}K1 and {ki}K1 are mutually indepen-
dent, a secrecy system is ideal when
H(mi|yi) 6= 0 and H(ki|yi) 6= 0, for all i. (19)
From (16) and (17), perfect secrecy is achieved when
H(mi|yi) = H(mi), for all i. (20)
An overview of measures on information-theoretic security
can be found in [24].
E. Lattice Preliminaries
To describe our scheme, it is convenient to introduce some
lattice preliminaries. An n-dimensional complex lattice ΛC in
a complex space Cm (n ≤ m) is the discrete set defined by:
ΛC =
{
Bu: u ∈ Z [i]n} ,
where the basis matrixB = [b1 · · ·bn] has linearly independent
columns.
ΛC can also be easily represented as 2n-dimensional real
lattice ΛR [25]. In what follows, we introduce some lattice
parameters of ΛC, which have a corresponding value for ΛR.
The Voronoi region of ΛC, defined by
Vi (ΛC) =
{
y ∈ Cm: ‖y − xi‖ ≤ ‖y − xj‖,∀ xi 6= xj
}
,
gives the nearest neighbor decoding region of lattice point xi.
The volume of any Vi (ΛC), defined as vol(ΛC) ,
|det(BHB)|, is equivalent to the volume of the corresponding
real lattice.
The effective radius of ΛC, denoted by reff(ΛC), is the
radius of a sphere of volume vol(ΛC) [26]. For large n, it is
approximately
reff(ΛC) ≈
√
n/(pie)vol(ΛC)
1
2n . (21)
III. UNSHARED SECRET KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM WITH
INFINITE CONSTELLATIONS
In this section, we consider the system model with an
infinite lattice constellations, satisfying the average transmit
power constraint. This provides the theoretical basis for un-
shared secret key cryptosystems.
A. Encryption
We consider a sequence of K mutually independent mes-
sages {mi}K1 , where each one is mapped to a transmitted
vector u ∈ Z [i]NB . The probability distribution of u can be
arbitrary, but has finite E(||u||2). To secure the K transmitted
vectors {ui}K1 , Alice enciphers {ui}K1 into the cryptograms
{yi}K1 using a sequence of mutually independent secret keys
{vi}K1 . We assume that {vi}K1 and {ui}K1 are mutually in-
dependent, and {Gi}K1 are mutually independent Gaussian
random matrices. No assumption is needed about the statistics
of {Hi}K1 across the K channel uses, since its realization is
known to both Alice and Eve.
Since {vi}K1 and {ui}K1 are mutually independent, from
(19) and (20), we only need to demonstrate the encryption
process for one transmitted vector ui. For simplicity, we drop
the subscript i.
For each u, Alice randomly and independently (without any
predefined distribution) chooses a one-time pad secret key v,
from a ball of radius
√
Pv:
S ,
{
v ∈ CNA−NB : ||v||2 ≤ Pv
}
, (22)
and transmits
x = V1u+ Zv. (23)
In the worst-case scenario, when nE = 0, Eve will receive
(10), i.e.,
y = GV1u+n˜v, (24)
where n˜v = GZv.
The signal model (24) can be interpreted as an encryption
algorithm, that is, the secret message u is encrypted to y using
a secret key v, which is not released neither to Bob nor to Eve.
The message u is received by Eve as a lattice point (see
Fig. 1) in:
ΛC = {GV1u,u ∈ Z [i]NB}. (25)
This enables us to partition the set S into D disjoint subsets
S1, ..., SD, such that
S =
D⋃
k=1
Sk, (26)
where
Sk ,
{
v: GV1u ∈ ΛC is the kth closest lattice point to y
}
.
(27)
As shown in Fig. 1, the value of D is determined by
D = |SRmax ∩ ΛC| , (28)
where SRmax is a sphere centered at y with radius
Rmax(Pv) , max
||v||2≤Pv
‖GZv‖ =
√
λmaxPv, (29)
where λmax is the largest eigenvalue of (GZ)H(GZ).
Assuming v ∈ Sk, 1 ≤ k ≤ D, the signal model (24) can be
further viewed as an encryption algorithm that encrypts u to
y using a one time pad secret key v, such that GV1u is the
kth closest lattice point to y.
The security problem lies in how much Eve knows about k.
The value of k is uniquely determined by the vector n˜v. Since
5we assume that the realizations of G and Z are known to Eve,
k is a function of v. Since v is randomly and independently
selected by Alice and is never disclosed to anyone, Eve can
neither know its realization nor its distribution. Thus, given y,
Eve is not able to estimate the distribution of the index k.
Remark 2: The index k can be interpreted as the effective
one-time pad secret key, whose randomness comes from the
artificial noise. The effective key space size is D.
From Eve’s perspective, we assume that she knows Pv,
Rmax(Pv), D and the encryption process (24). Based on the
above analysis, given y, Eve only knows that GV1u ∈ SRmax∩
ΛC. Therefore, the posterior probability that Eve obtains u, or
equivalently, finds k, from the cryptogram y, is equal to
Pr {u|y} = Pr {k|y} = Pr {u|u ∈ U} , (30)
where
U , {u′: GV1u′ ∈ SRmax ∩ ΛC} , (31)
and |U| = D.
For any u′ ∈ U , using Bayes’ theorem, we have
Pr
{
u = u′|u ∈ U} = Pr
{
u = u′
}
Pr
{
u ∈ U|u = u′}
Pr {u ∈ U}
=
Pr
{
u = u′
}
Pr {u ∈ U} . (32)
From (30) and (32), Eve’s equivocation is given by
H(u|y) = H(k|y) =
∑
u
′∈U
Pr
{
u = u′
}
Pr {u ∈ U} log
Pr {u ∈ U}
Pr {u = u′} . (33)
Since
Pr {u ∈ U} =
∑
u
′∈U
Pr
{
u = u′
}
, (34)
the security level is determined by the cardinality of the set
U , or more specifically, by the value of D:
1) if D = 1, then Pr {u ∈ U} = Pr{u = u′}, so that
H(k|y) = H(u|y) = 0. (no security)
2) if D ≥ 2, then Pr {u ∈ U} > Pr{u = u′}, so that
H(k|y) = H(u|y) > 0. (ideal secrecy)
3) as D→∞, then Pr {u ∈ U} → 1, so that
H(k|y) = H(u|y) = H(u). (perfect secrecy)
Remark 3: Different from Shannon’s one-time pad cryp-
tosystem, the effective one-time pad secret key k is not shared
between Alice and Bob. In particular, it is independently
generated by Alice, but not needed by Bob to decipher, while it
is fully affecting Eve’s ability to decipher the original message.
This motivates the name of this cryptosystem as Unshared
Secret Key (USK) cryptosystem.
closest lattice point
||GZv|| y
maxR
th
k:uGV1
Sphere
maxR
S
C
Λ
Fig. 1. The USK cryptosystem with infinite constellations.
B. Analyzing Eve’s Equivocation
As shown in (33), Eve’s equivocation lies in the value of D,
which is known to Eve but not to Alice. We then estimate the
value of D from Alice’s perspective. According to (26) and
(27), D is a function of Pv, H, and G. Alice knows only Pv
and H, while regardingG, she knows the statistics, but doesn’t
know the realization. Although Alice cannot know the exact
value of D, she is able to estimate its cumulative distribution
function (cdf), denoted by
FD(d, Pv) , Pr {D < d} , (35)
where d is a positive integer.
In the next section, we will show that Alice can ensure
FD(d, Pv) → 0 by increasing Pv, i.e., she can guarantee that
D ≥ d, for any given d.
IV. THE SECURITY OF USK WITH INFINITE
CONSTELLATIONS
In this section, we show that the USK with infinite constel-
lations provides Shannon’s ideal secrecy and perfect secrecy.
To prove the main theorems, we first introduce some lemmas.
We first define
κ(d) , d1/(2NE)/
√
pi, (36)
∆(d) ,
κ(d)2NEvol(ΛC)
PNEv
, (37)
where d is an integer and
vol(ΛC) = |det((GV1)H (GV1))|. (38)
Here, G is a complex Gaussian random matrix, while V1
is deterministic. Thus, ∆(d) is a random variable from Alice
perspective. The following two lemmas are used to evaluate
FD(d, Pv) in (35).
Lemma 1: If Pv ≥ ρ2/Φ2NB/NE and ρ > κ(d), then ∆(d) a.s.→
0 as NB →∞, or equivalently,
Pr
{
∆(d) >
(
ρ
κ(d)
)−NB}
< O
((
ρ
κ(d)
)−NB)
(39)
where
Φ =
[
(NE −NB)!
NE!
] 1
2NB
. (40)
Proof: See Appendix A.
6We next provide a more accurate expression of the tail
distribution of ∆(d) for finite NB.
Lemma 2: If Pv ≥ ρ2/Φ2NB/NE and ρ > κ(d), then
Pr
{
∆(d) >
(
ρ
κ(d)
)−NB}
< Υ
(
ρ
κ(d)
)
, (41)
where κ(d) is given in (36), Φ is given (40), and
Υ(x) =
NB∑
i=1
(
xe1−x
)NE−i+1
. (42)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 4: From (42), it is easy to see that Υ(x) is mono-
tonically decreasing function. Let
N , NE −NB + 1, (43)
then, as x→∞, we have
Υ(x) = O
((
x−1ex
)−N)
= O
(
e−xN
)
. (44)
Lemmas 1 and 2 enable us to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3: If Pv ≥ ρ2/Φ2NB/NE and ρ > κ(d), FD(d, Pv) →
0 as NB →∞, or equivalently,
FD(d, Pv) < O
((
ρ
κ(d)
)−NB)
, (45)
and for finite NB, we have
FD(d, Pv) <
(
ρ
κ(d)
)−NB
+Υ
(
ρ
κ(d)
)
, (46)
where κ(d) is given in (36), Φ is given in (40), and Υ(x) is
given in (42).
Proof: See Appendix C.
A. Achieving Ideal Secrecy
From (19) and the discussion following (33), ideal secrecy
is achieved when D ≥ 2. Lemma 3 enable us to prove the
following equivalent theorem about achieving ideal secrecy.
Theorem 1: If Pv > κ(d)2/Φ2NB/NE and d ≥ 2, as NB →∞,
D
a.s.≥ d, (47)
where κ(d) is given in (36) and Φ is given in (40).
Proof: From (35) and (45), it is straightforward to see
that Pr (D < d)→ 0 as NB →∞.
Theorem 1 shows that for the USK, Eve cannot find a unique
solution u, since D is almost surely greater than 2.
We next estimate the secrecy outage probability when NB
is finite, defined by
Pout(d) , Pr {D < d} , (48)
for any d ≥ 2.
Theorem 2: Let Nmin = min {N , NB}, where N is given in
(43). If
Pv ≥ ε−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NB/NE (49)
and d ≥ 2, then
Pout(d) < O(ε), (50)
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Fig. 2. Pout(d) vs. ε with NA = 9, NB = 4 and NE = 8.
for any arbitrarily small ε > 0, i.e., ideal secrecy is achieved
with probability 1− O(ε), where κ(d) is given in (36) and Φ
is given in (40).
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem 2 shows that for finite NB, the outage of ideal
secrecy can be made arbitrarily small by increasing Pv.
Example 1: Let us apply Theorem 2 to the analysis of a
USK scheme with NA = 9, NB = 4, NE = 8, σ2E = 0, and
Pv = ε
−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NB/NE . (51)
We evaluate the secrecy outage probability in (48) for the ith
channel use. We generate 50000 pairs of mutually independent
complex gaussian random matrices {G,H}. For each pair of
{G,H}, we evaluate the corresponding realization D˜ of the
random variable D by
D˜ ≈ vol(SRmax)
vol(ΛC)
=
(
Rmax(Pv)
reff(ΛC)
)2NB
, (52)
where reff(ΛC) is given in (21), Rmax(Pv) is given in (29).
Based on the corresponding 50000 realizations of D, we
compute the probability of D < d, i.e., Pout(d). Fig. 2 shows
the value of Pout(d) as a function of ε, with d = 2 and d = 644
(large number), respectively. As expected, the value of Pout(d)
decreases with decreasing ε, or equivalently, increasing Pv.
B. Achieving Perfect Secrecy
From (20), perfect secrecy requires
H(u|y) = H(u) (53)
According to (33), the problem then reduces to ensuring Di →
∞. From Theorems 1 and 2, achieving perfect secrecy requires
infinite AN peak power Pv, which is of theoretical interest
only.
V. UNSHARED SECRET KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM WITH
FINITE CONSTELLATIONS
In this section, we show that the idea of USK can be applied
to practical systems using finite constellations. In this case,
7we define the concept of secrecy outage and define a secrecy
outage probability. We will later show how such probability
can be made arbitrarily small by considering either longer
blocks of messages or larger constellation size.
A. Encryption
We consider a sequence of K mutually independent mes-
sages {ml}K1 , where each one contains n mutually indepen-
dent information bits. For each m, Alice maps the corre-
sponding n bits to NB elements of u for B channel uses.
Each elements of u is uniformly selected from a M-QAM
constellation Q˜, where ℜ(Q˜) = ℑ(Q˜) = {0, 1, ...,√M − 1}. We
ignore the shifting and scaling operations at Alice to minimize
the transmit power. Consequently, we have
n = BNB log2M . (54)
Let {ui}B1 be the block of transmitted vectors corresponding
to one message m.
To secure the total C = KB transmitted vectors
{
uj
}C
1
,
Alice enciphers
{
uj
}C
1
into the cryptograms
{
yj
}C
1
using a
sequence of mutually independent keys
{
vj
}C
1
. Across the C
channel uses, we assume that
{
vj
}C
1
and
{
uj
}C
1
are mutually
independent, and
{
Gj
}C
1
are mutually independent Gaussian
random matrices. No assumption is needed about the statistics
of
{
Hj
}C
1
, since its realization is known to Alice and Eve.
Since
{
vj
}C
1
and
{
uj
}C
1
are mutually independent, using
(19), we only need to demonstrate the encryption process for
one block of transmitted vectors {ui}B1 corresponding to a
message m.
The encryption process is the same as that of the infinite
constellation case: for the ith channel use, Alice independently
chooses a one time pad key vi from the set S in (22), and
encrypts ui to yi in (24) using vi, such that GiV1,iui is the
kthi closest lattice point to yi, within the infinite lattice
ΛC,i = {GiV1,iu,u ∈ Z [i]NB}. (55)
The value of ki ranges from 1 to Di, where
Di = |SRmax,i ∩ ΛC,i|, (56)
and SRmax,i is a sphere centered at yi with radius:
Rmax,i(Pv) , max
||vi||
2≤Pv
‖GiZivi‖ =
√
λmax,iPv. (57)
where λmax,i is the largest eigenvalue of (GiZi)H(GiZi). As
shown in Fig. 3, Di represents the total number of points
within the sphere SRmax,i .
Different from the infinite constellation case, the condition
Di ≥ 2 in (33) cannot ensure H(ui|yi) > 0. The reason is that
Eve knows that GiV1,iui is a finite lattice constellation, i.e.,
a finite subset of ΛC,i:
ΛF,i , {GiV1,iu,u ∈ Q˜NB}. (58)
Since ki is a function of vi, which is randomly and
independently selected by Alice and is never disclosed to
anyone, Eve can neither know the distribution of ki. Given
y
Sphere
maxR
S
:FΛ
:
C
Λ
uGV1
Fig. 3. The USK cryptosystem with finite constellations.
yi, Eve only knows that GiV1,iui ∈ SRmax,i ∩ΛF,i. Let Li be
the cardinality of such choices, i.e.,
Li = |SRmax,i ∩ ΛF,i|. (59)
Since ΛF,i ⊂ ΛC,i, we have
1 ≤ Li ≤ Di. (60)
As shown in Fig. 3, Li represents the number of solid points
within the sphere SRmax,i .
Remark 5: Due to the use of finite constellation Q˜NB , we
redefine the effective secrecy key ki as kF,i, that is, GiV1,iui
is the kthF,i closest lattice point to yi, within the finite lattice
constellation ΛF,i. The corresponding key space size is Li per
channel use.
Remark 6: The practical secrecy scheme [21] is a special
case of USK cryptosystem with kF,i ≥ 2.
B. Analyzing Eve’s Equivocation
We then show that Eve’s equivocation H({ui}B1 | {yi}B1 )
is determined by {Li}B1 . The posterior probability that Eve
obtains ui, or equivalently, finds kF,i, is equal to
Pr
{
ui|yi
}
= Pr
{
kF,i|yi
}
= Pr
{
ui|ui ∈ UF,i
}
. (61)
where
UF,i ,
{
u
′: GiV1,iu
′ ∈ SRmax,i ∩ ΛF,i
}
. (62)
Due to the use of uniform constellation Q˜NB , according to
Bayes’ theorem, we have
Pr
{
ui|ui ∈ UF,i
}
=
1
Li
. (63)
To recover one message m, Eve has to recover all vectors
in {ui}B1 , or equivalently, find
{
kF,i
}B
1
. Therefore, Eve’s
equivocation is given by
H(m| {yi}B1 ) = H(
{
kF,i
}B
1
| {yi}B1 ) = H({ui}B1 | {yi}B1 ).
(64)
Moreover, since ui is independent of uj and yj , we have
H({ui}B1 | {yi}B1 ) =
B∑
i=1
H(ui|yi) =
B∑
i=1
logLi. (65)
8C. Ideal Secrecy Outage
Based on (65), Eve’s equivocation is dominated by the
values in {Li}B1 , which are known to Eve. From Alice’s
perspective, according to (59) and (62), Li is a function of
Gi, thus a random variable. Although Alice cannot know the
exact values in {Li}B1 , she may be able to evaluate the cdf of
Eve’s equivocation, given by
Pr
{
B∑
i=1
logLi < log d
}
≤ Pr {logLi < log d, 1 ≤ i ≤ B}
= Pr {L1 < d, ..., LB < d}
, PF,out(d,B). (66)
where 2 ≤ d ≤MNB .
We refer to the event
B∑
i=1
logLi < log d, (67)
as the secrecy outage due to the use of the finite constellation
Q˜NB . We refer to PF,out(d,B) as the secrecy outage probability.
From (65) and (66), if PF,out(d,B)→ 0,
H({ui}B1 | {yi}B1 ) = H(
{
kF,i
}B
1
| {yi}B1 ) ≥ log d. (68)
In the next section, we will show that Alice can ensure
PF,out(d,B)→ 0 by increasing the message block size B with
certain M and Pv.
VI. THE SECURITY OF USK WITH FINITE
CONSTELLATIONS
In this section, we show that the USK with the finite
constellation Q˜NB provides Shannon’s ideal secrecy with an
arbitrarily small outage. To prove the main theorems, we first
introduce the following lemma.
We define
Θ(Pv) ,
2Rmax(Pv)√
Mreff(ΛC)
. (69)
where reff(ΛC) is given in (21) and Rmax(Pv) is given in (57).
From Alice perspective, Θ(Pv) is a function of G, thus is a
random variable. Its cdf is bounded by the following lemma.
Lemma 4:
Pr {Θ(Pv) < x}
>
NB∏
j=1
BNE(NA−NB),
NE−j+1
(
NE (NA −NB) g(x, j)
NE (NA −NB) g(x, j) +NE − j + 1
)
,
(70)
where
g(x, j) =
x2MNB(NE − j + 1)
4piePvNE (NA −NB) , (71)
and Ba,b(x) is the regularized incomplete beta function [27]:
Ba,b(x) ,
a+b−1∑
j=a
(
a+ b− 1
j
)
xj(1− x)a+b−1−j . (72)
Proof: See Appendix E.
A. Achieving Ideal Secrecy
As shown in (19) and (65), ideal secrecy is achieved when∑B
i=1 logLi > 0. From (66), the problem then reduces to
ensuring
PF,out(d,B)→ 0, (73)
for any d ≥ 2. Lemma 4 enables us to prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: If ε < 1, d ≥ 2, Pv = ε−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NB/NE ,
and M ≥ ε−3−2/Nminκ(d)2, then
PF,out(d,B) < O(ε
B), (74)
where κ(d) is given in (36) and Φ is given in (40), i.e., ideal
secrecy is achieved with probability 1−O(εB).
Proof: See Appendix F.
Theorem 3 shows that for finite NB and finite constellation
Q˜NB , the ideal secrecy outage can be made arbitrarily small.
Given a desired pair {ε, d}, Alice can easily compute the
required values of Pv and M to realize the USK cryptosystem.
Example 2: We consider a USK scheme with NA = 4, NB =
2, NE = 3 and σ2E = 0. To apply Theorem 3, we fix d = 2
and consider two cases where ε = 0.3981 and 0.1990. The
conditions in Theorem 3 then reduce to
Pv = 1.8306 and M ≥ 15.9659, for ε = 0.3981,
Pv = 3.6620 and M ≥ 255.7297, for ε = 0.1990. (75)
Fig. 4 compares the value of PF,out(2, B) as a function of B.
Note that PF,out(2, B) can be written as
Pr {L1 = 1, ..., LB = 1} = Pr
{
B∑
i=1
logLi = 0
}
. (76)
We observe that PF,out(2, B) = 4.6250×10−4 when Pv = 3.6620,
M = 256, and B = 1. It confirms that the secrecy outage
probability can be made arbitrarily small by increasing Pv and
M . Meanwhile, we observe that the secrecy outage probability
decreases exponentially with B.
Remark 7: For the finite constellation case, the value of
target equivocation at Eve is given by log d in (68). Note that
this is not easily computable for the infinite constellation case
according to (33).
B. Peak AN-to-Signal Power Ratio
By shifting and scaling, u ∈ Q˜NB can be converted into
a regular M-QAM symbol u¯ ∈ QNB . To measure the power
efficiency of the proposed USK cryptosystem, we define
r ,
Pv
E(||V1u¯||2)
, (77)
as the ratio of the peak AN power Pv and the average
transmitted signal power.
Since
E(||V1u¯||2) = E(||u¯||2) = 2 (M − 1)NB
3
, (78)
the corresponding ratio as a function of Pv is given by
r =
3Pv
2 (M − 1)NB . (79)
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Fig. 4. PF,out(2, B) vs. M and B with NA = 4, NB = 2 and NE = 3.
Example 3: Under the same setting of Example 2, if M =
256, r = 1.08%. We see that the proposed USK cryptosystem
is very practical, since it requires a very small proportion of
the total transmission power. Note that the value of r can be
further reduced by increasing the constellation size M .
VII. DISCUSSIONS
A. USK Cryptosystems vs. Previous AN based Schemes
The existing AN based security schemes [19], [28], [29]
leverage infinite-length wiretap codes, where the aim is to
achieve strong secrecy.
In contrast, the proposed USK cryptosystem is valid for
any coded/uncoded MIMO with finite block length and QAM
signalling. Our scheme achieves Shannon’s ideal secrecy with
an arbitrarily small outage probability.
B. Extension to the Case of NE ≥ NA
The constraint NE < NA is a common assumption that
appears in the vast literature on AN based schemes [19], [28],
[29]. Under this condition, we have shown the existence of an
unshared secret key cryptosystem which provides Shannon’s
ideal secrecy.
If NE ≥ NA, G has a left inverse, denoted by G†, then Eve
can remove the unshared secret key v by multiplying y by
W = HG†, i.e.,
Wy =HV1u+WnE. (80)
We can show that this attack amplifies Eve’s channel noise
greatly. Consequently, nE takes the role of the unshared secret
key. We can show that with certain amount of σ2E, ideal secrecy
is achievable. This result will be reported in our next paper.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have exploited the role that artificial noise plays in
physical layer security to show that it can be used as an
unshared one-time pad secret key. The proposed unshared
secret key (USK) cryptosystem with an infinite lattice input
alphabet provides Shannon’s ideal secrecy and perfect secrecy
by tuning the power allocated to the artificial noise com-
ponent. Moreover, unlike the traditional AN technique, this
USK system can be applied to practical systems using finite
lattice constellations. We have shown that ideal secrecy can
be obtained with an arbitrarily small outage probability. Our
results provide analytical insights relating cryptography and
physical layer security on a fundamental level. Future work
will generalize USK to relaying networks.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Recalling that
∆(d) =
κ(d)2NE | det((GV1)H(GV1))|
PNEv
. (81)
From Alice’s perspective, G is a complex Gaussian random
matrix. The matrix V1 with orthonormal columns is known.
According to [30], GV1 a Gaussian random matrix with i.i.d.
elements. Moreover, | det((GV1)H(GV1))| can be expressed
as the product of independent Chi-squared variables [31]:
|det((GV1)H(GV1))| =
NB∏
i=1
1
2
X 2 (2(NE − i+ 1)) . (82)
Using the properties of the Chi-squared distribution and
central limit theorem, as NB →∞, we have
NB∑
i=1
logX 2 (2(NE − i+ 1))− A
√
V
a.s.→ N (0, 1), (83)
where
A =
NB∑
i=1
E
(
logX 2 (2(NE − i+ 1))
)
,
V =
NB∑
i=1
Var
(
logX 2 (2(NE − i+ 1))
)
.
Using the properties of Log Chi-squared distributions [32],
we have
A =
NE∑
k=NE−NB+1
(log 2 + ψ(k)) ,
V =
NE∑
k=NE−NB+1
ψ1(k),
where ψ(x) = ddx log Γ(x) is the digamma function, and
ψ1(x) =
d2
dx2 log Γ(x) is the trigamma function.
Informally, we may write (82) and (83) as
|det((GV1)H(GV1))| ≈ 2−NBeA+N (0, V ). (84)
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According to (84), as NB → ∞, ∆(d) converges to the
random variable Ω:
Ω ,
κ(d)2NE exp (A+N (0, V ))
2NBPNEv
. (85)
To simplify the expressions of A and V , we use the
following approximations [32]:
ψ(k) ≈ log k − 1/(2k),
ψ1(k) ≈ 1/k. (86)
Then, we have
V ≤
NB∑
i=1
1
k
≤ logNB + ς < log 2NB, (87)
where ς is Euler–Mascheroni constant. Similarly, we have
A =
NE∑
k=NE−NB+1
(
log 2 + log k − 1
2k
)
< NB log 2 + log Φ
−2NB
, (88)
where
Φ =
[
(NE −NB)!
NE!
] 1
2NB
. (89)
From (88) and (85), Ω can be upper bounded by
Ω <
κ(d)2NE exp (N (0, V ))
Φ2NBPNEv
. (90)
Recall that NE ≥ NB. By substituting Pv ≥ ρ2/Φ2NB/NE and
ρ > κ(d) to the right side of (90), we have
Ω <
exp (N (0, V ))
(ρ/κ(d))2NE
≤ exp (N (0, V ))
(ρ/κ(d))2NB
, ΩUB, (91)
and
Pr
{
∆(d) > (ρ/κ(d))−NB
}
< Pr
{
ΩUB > (ρ/κ(d))
−NB
}
= Pr {N (0, V ) > NB log (ρ/κ(d))}
< 1/2 exp
(
−N
2
B log
2 (ρ/κ(d))
2V
)
a
< 1/2 exp
(
−N
2
B log
2 (ρ/κ(d))
2 log 2NB
)
= O
(
(ρ/κ(d))−NB
)
, (92)
where (a) holds because of (87).
From (92) and (81), if ρ > κ(d), as NB → ∞, we have
∆(d)
a.s.→ 0. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We recall (81) and (82) and consider the random variable
Ψ ,
NB∏
i=1
X 2 (2(NE − i+ 1))
2(NE − i+ 1) . (93)
Recalling that NE ≥ NB. By substituting Ψ, Pv ≥
ρ2/Φ2NB/NE and ρ > κ(d) to the right side of (81), we have
∆(d) = (ρ/κ(d))−2NE Ψ
≤ (ρ/κ(d))−2NB Ψ. (94)
Consequently, we obtain
Pr
{
∆(d) > (ρ/κ(d))−NB
}
≤ Pr
{
Ψ(ρ/κ(d))−2NB > (ρ/κ(d))−NB
}
= Pr
{
Ψ > (ρ/κ(d))NB
}
a≤ Pr
{
NB∑
i=1
X 2 (2(NE − i+ 1))
2(NE − i+ 1) > NBρ/κ(d)
}
<
NB∑
i=1
Pr
{
X 2 (2(NE − i+ 1)) ≥ 2(NE − i+ 1)ρ/κ(d)
}
≤
NB∑
i=1
(
e1−ρ/κ(d)ρ/κ(d)
)NE−i+1
, Υ(ρ/κ(d)), (95)
where (a) holds due to the inequality of arithmetic and
geometric means. 
C. Proof of Lemma 3
We pick an element v0 from S with ||v0||2 = Pv. Suppose
that v0 ∈ Sk0 , where k0 is the corresponding effective secret
key. Since D ≥ k0, we have
FD(d, Pv) = Pr {D < d} < Pr {k0 ≤ d} . (96)
The problem then reduces to evaluating Pr {k0 ≤ d}.
Let SR be a sphere of radius R ≤ Rmax(Pv) centered at y,
where vol(SR) = d·vol(ΛC) (see Fig. 1). Let K be the number
of the points in SR ∩ ΛC. We have
K ≈ vol(SR)
vol(ΛC)
= d. (97)
If GV1u ∈ SR, we have k0 ≤ d, and vice versa. Thus, the
two events are equivalent, i.e.,
Pr {k0 ≤ d} = Pr {GV1u ∈ SR} . (98)
Let S ′R be a sphere with the same radius R centered at
GV1u. If GV1u ∈ SR, then y ∈ S ′R, and vice versa. Thus,
the two events are equivalent, i.e.,
Pr {GV1u ∈ SR} = Pr
{
y ∈ S ′R
}
. (99)
From (96), (98) and (99), we have
FD(d, Pv)
< Pr
{
y ∈ S ′R
}
= Pr
{
y ∈ S ′R|vol(S ′R) ≤ C
} · Pr{vol(S ′R) ≤ C}+
Pr
{
y ∈ S ′R|vol(S ′R) > C
} · Pr{vol(S ′R) > C}
< Pr
{
y ∈ S ′R|vol(S ′R) ≤ C
}
+ Pr
{
vol(S ′R) > C
}(100)
where C is a positive number.
We then evaluate the two terms in (100) separately. We use
the same settings as Lemmas 1 and 2, i.e., Pv ≥ ρ2/Φ2NB/NE ,
ρ > κ(d). We set
C = piNEPNEv
(
ρ
κ(d)
)−NB
. (101)
1) Pr{y ∈ S ′R|vol(S ′R) ≤ C}: Let SC be a sphere centered
at GV1u, where vol(SC) = C. Let SC0 be a sphere centered
at the origin, where vol(SC0) = C. Recalling that Alice knows
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Z and v0. For G, Alice knows its statistics, but doesn’t know
its realization. Therefore, from Alice perspective, n˜v = GZv0
has i.i.d. NC(0, Pv) components [30].
Therefore, we have
Pr
{
y ∈ S ′R|vol(S ′R) ≤ C
}
≤ Pr {y ∈ SC}
=
∫
SC0
f(n˜v)dn˜v
≤ C
piNEPNEv
= (ρ/κ(d))−NB , (102)
where f(n˜v) is the probability density function (pdf) of n˜v.
The last inequality holds since
f(n˜v) =
1
piNEPNEv
exp
(
−||n˜v||
2
σ˜2v
)
≤ 1
piNEPNEv
. (103)
2) Pr{vol(S ′R) > C}: Since vol(S ′R) = d·vol(ΛC), we have
Pr
{
vol(S ′R) > C
}
= Pr
{
∆(d) > (ρ/κ(d))−NB
}
. (104)
From (100), (102), (104) and (39), as NB →∞,
FD(d, Pv) < O
((
ρ
κ(d)
)−NB)
. (105)
From (100), (102), (104) and (41), when NB is finite,
FD(d, Pv) <
(
ρ
κ(d)
)−NB
+Υ
(
ρ
κ(d)
)
. (106)

D. Proof of Theorem 2
From (48) and (33), we have
Pout(d) = FD(d, Pv). (107)
Let ρ = ε−1/Nminκ(d), for arbitrarily small ε > 0. We have
(ρ/κ(d))−NB = εNB/Nmin ≤ ε. (108)
From Lemma 3, (108), and (44), if Pv ≥ ρ2/Φ2NB/NE , we
have
FD(d, Pv) < ε+Υ(ε
−1/Nmin) = O(ε), (109)
or equivalently,
Pout(d) < O(ε). (110)

E. Proof of Lemma 4
Recalling that
Rmax(Pv) = max
||v||2≤Pv
‖GZv‖ , (111)
reff(ΛC) =
√
NB/(pie)|det((GV1)H(GV1))|
1
2NB . (112)
From (29), applying Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
R2max(Pv) = λmaxPv ≤ Pv ‖GZ‖2F . (113)
From Alice perspective, GZ is a complex Gaussian random
matrix with i.i.d. components. Thus, ‖GZ‖2F can be expressed
in terms of a Chi-squared random variable:
‖GZ‖2F =
1
2
X 2 (2NE (NA −NB)) . (114)
According to (82), reff(ΛC) can be expressed in terms of NB
independent Chi-squared variables:
reff(ΛC) =
√
NB/(pie)

 NB∏
j=1
1
2
X 2 (2(NE − j + 1))


1
2NB
.
(115)
Moreover, since GV1 and GZ are mutually independent
[30], Rmax(Pv) and reff(ΛC) are independent.
Then, we have
Pr
{
2Rmax,i(Pv)√
Mreff,i(ΛC)
< x
}
≥ Pr
{
Pv ‖GZ‖2F
reff(ΛC)2
<
x2M
4
}
= Pr


X 2 (2NE (NA −NB))(∏NB
j=1 X 2 (2(NE − j + 1))
) 1
NB
<
x2MNB
4piePv


a≥ Pr


X 2 (2NE (NA −NB))
NB∑NB
j=1
1
X 2 (2(NE − j + 1))
<
x2MNB
4piePv


= Pr


NB∑
j=1
X 2 (2NE (NA −NB))
X 2 (2(NE − j + 1)) <
x2MN2B
4piePv


b
>
NB∏
j=1
Pr
{X 2 (2NE (NA −NB))
X 2 (2(NE − j + 1)) ≤
x2MNB
4piePv
}
=
NB∏
j=1
Pr {F(2NE (NA −NB) , 2(NE − j + 1)) ≤ g(x, j)} ,
(116)
where g(x, j) is given in (71), and F(k1, k2) represents an F-
distributed random variable with k1 and k2 degrees of freedom.
(a) holds due to the inequality of geometric and harmonic
means. (b) holds by induction on the fact that if the non-
negative random variables Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are mutually
independent, given a constant C > 0,
Pr
{
N∑
i=1
Ai < C
}
> Pr
{
A1 ≤ C/N ;
N∑
i=2
Ai ≤ C(N − 1)/N
}
= Pr {A1 ≤ C/N}Pr
{
N∑
i=2
Ai ≤ C(N − 1)/N
}
. (117)
Since the cdf of F(k1, k2) can be expressed using the
regularized incomplete beta function [27], the final expression
of (116) is given in (70).

F. Proof of Theorem 3
From Alice perspective, Li is a function of Gi. Since {Gi}B1
are mutually independent, {Li}B1 are mutually independent.
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From (66), we have
PF,out(d,B) =
B∏
i=1
Pr {Li < d} . (118)
We then evaluate Pr {Li < d}. For simplicity, we re-
move the index i. According to Theorem 2, with Pv =
ε−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NB/NE , we have
Pr(D < d) < O(ε). (119)
We can upper bound Pr {L < d} by
Pr {L < d}
= Pr{L < d|D ≥ d}Pr{D ≥ d}+ Pr{L < d|D < d}Pr{D < d}
≤ Pr {L < D|D ≥ d}Pr{D ≥ d}+O(ε)
≤ Pr {L < D}+O(ε). (120)
We then evaluate Pr {L < D}.
Pr {L < D} = Pr{L < D|Θ(Pv) < ε}Pr{Θ(Pv) < ε}
+ Pr{L < D|Θ(Pv) ≥ ε}Pr{Θ(Pv) ≥ ε}
≤ Pr{L < D|Θ(Pv) < ε}+Pr{Θ(Pv) ≥ ε}, (121)
where Θ(Pv) is given in (69).
We then evaluate the two terms in (121), separately.
1) Pr {L < D|Θ(Pv) < ε}: Recalling that
y = GV1u+GZv, (122)
ΛF = {GV1u,u ∈ Q˜NB}. (123)
Since L = |SRmax∩ΛF|, we begin by checking the boundary
of ΛF. Let O be the center point of ΛF. According to [33], for
the Gaussian random lattice basis GV1, the boundary of ΛF
can be approximated by a sphere SF,S centered at O with radius√
Mreff(ΛC), where reff(ΛC) is given in (21).
Given Θ(Pv) < ε and ε < 1, we have
√
Mreff(ΛC) >
2Rmax(Pv). We define a concentric sphere SF,C with radius√
Mreff(ΛC) − 2Rmax(Pv), where Rmax(Pv) is given in (29).
We then check when L = D given Θ(Pv) < ε.
If GV1u ∈ SF,C, using triangle inequality, we have
||y −O|| ≤ ‖GV1u−O‖+ ‖GZv‖
≤
√
Mreff(ΛC)−Rmax(Pv). (124)
We then check the locations of the D elements in SRmax ∩ΛC
(56), denoted by, GV1u′t, 1 ≤ t ≤ D. Note that∥∥GV1u′t − y∥∥ ≤ Rmax(Pv). (125)
From (124) and (125), using triangle inequality, for all t,∥∥GV1u′t −O∥∥ ≤ ‖y −O‖+ ∥∥GV1u′t − y∥∥ ≤ √Mreff(ΛC).
(126)
Therefore, SRmax ∩ ΛC ⊂ ΛF, i.e., L = D.
If GV1u /∈ SF,C, there is a probability that L < D.
Therefore, we have
Pr {L < D|Θ(Pv) < ε} < Pr {GV1u /∈ SF,C} . (127)
Since GV1u is uniformly distributed over SF,S, we have
Pr {GV1u ∈ SF,C} =
vol(SF,C)
vol(SF,S)
= (1−Θ(Pv))2NB > (1− ε)2NB
(128)
Based on (127) and (128), we have
Pr {L < D|Θ(Pv) < ε} < 1− (1− ε)2NB = O(ε). (129)
2) Pr{Θ(Pv) ≥ ε}: Using Lemma 4 with M ≥
ε−3−2/Nminκ(d)2, we have
Pr {Θ(Pv) < ε} ≥
NB∏
j=1
Ba,b(j)
(
1− b(j)
ag(ε, j) + b(j)
)
a
=
NB∏
j=1
1−Bb(j),a
(
b(j)
ag(ε, j) + b(j)
)
b
=
NB∏
j=1
(
1−O(εNE−j+1)
)
>
(
1−O(εN )
)NB
, (130)
where N = NE −NB + 1 and
a = NE(NA −NB) and b(j) = NE − j + 1. (131)
(a) and (b) hold due to the facts that
Ba,b(x) = 1−Bb,a(1− x), (132)
Bb(j),a(x) = O(x
b(j)), for x→ 0. (133)
Consequently, we have
Pr{Θ(Pv) ≥ ε} < 1−
(
1−O(εN )
)NB
= O(εN ). (134)
By substituting (121), (129) and (134) to (120), we have
Pr {L < d} < O(ε). (135)
From (118) and (135), if M ≥ ε−3−2/Nminκ(d)2 and Pv =
ε−2/Nminκ(d)2/Φ2NB/NE , we have
PF,out(d,B) < O(ε
B). (136)

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